| 引用本文: | 顾慧杰,彭超逸,许丹莉,等.激励性含柔性负荷日前市场出清电价机制的建模[J].电力系统保护与控制,2020,48(12):23-32.[点击复制] |
| GU Huijie,PENG Chaoyi,XU Danli,et al.Research on modeling the incentive electricity pricing mechanism in day-ahead electricity market clearing containing flexible loads[J].Power System Protection and Control,2020,48(12):23-32[点击复制] |
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| 摘要: |
| 对于电力市场而言，发电竞争只是电力改革的初级阶段，进一步让柔性负荷参与市场竞价是电力市场化的必经之路。传统上采用节点边际电价的日前市场出清电价机制，理论与实践均证明，该机制难以同时实现个体理性、激励相容和社会福利最大化等要求。考虑到电力市场成员之间的信息不对称性，为克服电力市场中市场成员的策略性报价行为，实现市场的高效运行及社会福利最大化，基于VCG的机制设计理论，给出了一种考虑发电机组和柔性负荷参与日前市场出清的电价机制，该机制同时满足激励相容、个体理性以及社会福利最大化要求。最后，采用某2节点系统和修改的IEEE14节点系统为例说明了该日前市场出清电价机制的基本特征。 |
| 关键词: 电力市场 柔性负荷 VCG机制设计理论 日前市场出清 电价机制 激励相容 个体理性 社会福利最大化 |
| DOI：10.19783/j.cnki.pspc.190804 |
| 投稿时间：2019-07-11修订日期：2019-10-31 |
| 基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目资助(U1965104) |
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| Research on modeling the incentive electricity pricing mechanism in day-ahead electricity market clearing containing flexible loads |
| GU Huijie,PENG Chaoyi,XU Danli,ZHOU Huafeng,SHI Xionghua,CHEN Genjun,GUO Chao,XIE Jun |
| (China Southern Power Grid Dispatching and Control Center, Guangzhou 510623, China;NR Electric Co., Ltd., Nanjing 211102, China;College of Energy and Electrical Engineering, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China) |
| Abstract: |
| Generation side competition is the preliminary stage of the electricity market. Flexible loads participating in market competition are inevitable for electric power industry deregulation. Traditionally, the pricing mechanism of locational marginal price is adopted for day-ahead market clearing. Both theory and practice have proved that it is difficult for the locational marginal price mechanism to simultaneously achieve the requirements of individual rationality, incentive compatibility and maximization of social welfare. Because of the imbalance in information in the electricity market, and in order to overcome the strategic bidding of market participants and realize the high trade efficiency and social welfare maximization, an electricity pricing mechanism for considering generators and flexible loads participating in the day-ahead market clearing is proposed based on VCG mechanism design theory. It meets incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and social welfare maximization simultaneously. Finally, the basic characteristics of the proposed day-ahead market clearing pricing mechanism are demonstrated by the simulation results of a 2-bus system and the revised IEEE14-bus system. This work is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. U1965104). |
| Key words: electricity market flexible loads VCG mechanism design theory day-ahead market clearing electricity pricing mechanism incentive compatibility individual rationality social welfare maximization |
