| 引用本文: | 程 雄,冯 佳,吕 欣,等.兼顾激励相容的水电富集电网中长期电力市场交易模型[J].电力系统保护与控制,2024,52(3):12-24.[点击复制] |
| CHENG Xiong,FENG Jia,LÜ Xin,et al.Medium and long-term electricity market trading model considering incentive compatibility in a hydropower-dominated grid[J].Power System Protection and Control,2024,52(3):12-24[点击复制] |
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| 摘要: |
| 针对我国水电富集地区梯级电站上下游中标电量与发电水量不匹配导致弃水和违约等问题，借鉴巴西电力市场中长期交易模式，提出兼顾激励相容的水电富集电网中长期交易模型。该模型以个体发电效益最大和电网侧购电成本最小作为激励相容的双重目标。首先以最小出力最大为目标对水电站群进行优化调度，所得各水电站每月发电量定义为其该月保证电量，并将保证电量拆分成基础电量、省内电量和西电东送电量。然后建立各级市场交易方法，基础电量按相似来水频率的历年平均电价收购，省内电量参与两轮拍卖，西电东送电量按剩余电量比重排序依次收购，采用强化学习确定各发电商份额和电价。最后利用改进的电量再分配机制对联盟内各水电站实发电量进行再分配。云南省5个流域52座电站群实例结果表明，所提模型能有效缓解当前梯级上下游电站弃水和违约等问题，促进了水电市场合理竞争和水资源充分利用。 |
| 关键词: 中长期交易模式 巴西电力市场 激励相容 强化学习 |
| DOI：10.19783/j.cnki.pspc.230980 |
| 投稿时间：2023-07-31修订日期：2023-01-04 |
| 基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目资助(51609124)；湖北省自然科学基金三峡创新发展联合基金项目资助(2022CFD167) |
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| Medium and long-term electricity market trading model considering incentive compatibility in a hydropower-dominated grid |
| CHENG Xiong1,2 ,FENG Jia3,LÜ Xin3,ZHONG Hao1,LI Wenwu1,YANG Shengyi4 |
| (1. Hubei Provincial Key Laboratory for Operation and Control of Cascaded Hydropower Stations and Renewable Energy, China
Three Gorges University, Yichang 443002, China; 2. College of Hydraulic & Environmental Engineering, China Three Gorges University, Yichang 443002, China; 3. College of Electrical Engineering and New Energy, China Three Gorges University, Yichang
443002, China; 4. Chitan Hydro-electric Power Plant, Huadian Furui Energy Development Co., Ltd., Sanming 353000, China) |
| Abstract: |
| There are problems such as surplus water and breach of contract caused by the mismatch between the bid winning electricity quantity and the generated water quantity in the upstream and downstream cascade power stations in hydropower enrichment areas. Thus a medium and long-term transaction model of hydropower enrichment grid with the consideration of incentive compatibility is proposed based on such a model of the Brazilian electricity market. The model takes the maximum benefit of individual power generation and the minimum cost of power purchase at the grid side as the dual goals of incentive compatibility. First, the minimum power generated of hydropower system is maximized to optimize the operation of the hydropower system, and the monthly generating capacity of each hydropower station is defined as the guaranteed electricity of this month. This is divided into basic, provincial and west-to-east electricity. Then, market trading methods at all levels are established. Basic electricity is purchased according to the average price of previous years with similar inflow, the provincial electricity participates in two rounds of auction, and the west-to-east electricity is purchased successively according to the proportion of remaining electricity. A reinforcement learning method is used to determine the share and price of each power producer. Finally, the improved electricity redistribution mechanism is used to reallocate the power generation of each hydropower station in the alliance. The results for 52 hydropower stations in 5 river basins in Yunnan Province show that the proposed model can effectively alleviate the problems of surplus water and breach of contract, and promote rational market competition and the full utilization of water resources. |
| Key words: medium and long-term trading mechanism Brazil’s electricity market incentive compatibility reinforcement learning |
