| 引用本文: | 季振东,黄立飞,虞坚阳,等.面向多利益主体的港区电能双层协调优化策略研究[J].电力系统保护与控制,2026,54(01):40-49.[点击复制] |
| JI Zhendong,HUANG Lifei,YU Jianyang,et al.Research on a bi-level coordinated optimization strategy of port-area electric energy considering multiple stakeholders[J].Power System Protection and Control,2026,54(01):40-49[点击复制] |
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| 摘要: |
| 为应对高比例分布式能源接入对港区能源和多主体利益结构的改变，提出一种面向多利益主体的港区电能双层协调优化策略。首先，介绍了港区能源系统架构，分析了各利益主体间的协调博弈过程。其次，建立了港区电能双层协调优化调度模型。上层主体为政府，通过制定合理的碳税政策实现下层整体成本的最小化。下层主从博弈的主体为港口集团和船东，港口集团为领导者，船东为跟随者。通过调整电能供需量来实现成本最小化，在供需平衡时达到博弈均衡。然后，分析了主从博弈模型的均衡条件和双层协调模型的具体求解方法。最后，通过算例对比分析了3种方案，验证了所提方法的经济性和环保性，为制定合理的“电能调度-碳税制定-岸电定价”策略提供了可靠建议。 |
| 关键词: 港区 多利益主体 主从博弈 电能调度 碳税 电价 |
| DOI：10.19783/j.cnki.pspc.250299 |
| 投稿时间：2025-03-23修订日期：2025-07-31 |
| 基金项目:国家电网有限公司总部科技项目资助(5400- 202418219A-1-1-ZN) |
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| Research on a bi-level coordinated optimization strategy of port-area electric energy considering multiple stakeholders |
| JI Zhendong1,HUANG Lifei1,YU Jianyang2,FAN Fei1,WU Wei2,LI Min2,GAO Haili2,CHAI Tingyi2 |
| (1. School of Automation, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Nanjing 210094, China;
2. Changzhou Power Supply Branch of State Grid Jiangsu Electric Power Co., Ltd., Changzhou 213003, China) |
| Abstract: |
| To address the changes in port-area energy systems and multi-stakeholder benefit structure caused by the high proportion of distributed energy access, this paper proposes a bi-level coordinated optimization strategy for port-area electric energy considering multiple stakeholders. First, the energy system architecture of the port area is introduced, and the coordination game process among various stakeholders is analyzed. Second, a bi-level coordinated optimal scheduling model for port-area electric energy is established. The upper-level decision-maker is the government, which minimizes the overall cost at the lower level by formulating appropriate carbon tax policies. At the lower level, a master-slave game is formulated between the port group and shipowners, where the port group acts as the leader and the shipowners as followers. Cost minimization is achieved by adjusting electric energy supply and demand, and a game equilibrium is reached when the supply and demand are balanced. Then, the equilibrium conditions of the master-slave game model and the specific solution method for the bi-level coordination model are analyzed. Finally, three schemes are compared and analyzed through case studies, which verify the economy and environmental protection of the proposed method, providing reliable guidance for formulating coordinated strategies of “power dispatching-carbon tax formulation-shore power pricing”. |
| Key words: port area multiple stakeholders master-slave game electric energy scheduling carbon tax electricity price |
