| 引用本文: | 杨洪朝,牛 犇,孟 科,等.考虑可控负荷功率调整的电力服务商分段式补偿定价决策[J].电力系统保护与控制,2020,48(22):100-108.[点击复制] |
| YANG Hongzhao,NIU Ben,MENG Ke,et al.Segmented compensation pricing decision of electric power service providersconsidering controllable load power adjustment[J].Power System Protection and Control,2020,48(22):100-108[点击复制] |
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| 摘要: |
| 鉴于分布式电源出力和终端用户负荷需求的随机性，电力服务商实际购买电量与电力市场竞标电量存在偏差，这种偏差会带来惩罚成本。为此，考虑将需求侧可控负荷作为可调度资源，基于可控负荷用户增/减负荷成本函数，提出了一种分段式价格形式的多选项可控负荷功率调整补偿合同。为实现电力服务商与可控负荷用户双赢，建立了兼顾电力服务商经济效益和可控负荷用户需求响应效益的 型stackelberg主从博弈模型，并采用基于遗传算法的逆向归纳法求解。最后，通过算例对比了分段式补偿电价和固定补偿电价下电力服务商运营收益和可控负荷用户功率调整量之间的变化情况。仿真结果表明，所提出的分段式补偿定价方法能够明显降低惩罚成本，有效提高用户需求响应的参与度，实现需求响应资源的优化配置。 |
| 关键词: 电力服务商 可控负荷需求响应 惩罚成本 分段式补偿电价 主从博弈 |
| DOI：DOI: 10.19783/j.cnki.pspc.190678 |
| 投稿时间：2019-06-13修订日期：2020-09-09 |
| 基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目资助(71931003， 71420107027)；湖南省科技计划项目资助(2019CT5001， 2018GK4002，2019WK2011) |
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| Segmented compensation pricing decision of electric power service providersconsidering controllable load power adjustment |
| YANG Hongzhao,NIU Ben,MENG Ke,XU Jiangping,LUO Yiting |
| (1. School of Software, Changsha Social Work College, Changsha 410004, China; 2. Zhangjiakou Power Supply Company,
State Grid Jibei Electric Power Company Limited, Zhangjiakou 075000, China; 3. School of Electrical and Information
Engineering, Changsha University of Science and Technology, Hunan Provincial Engineering Research Center of
Electric Transportation and Smart Distribution Network, Changsha 410114, China; 4. School of Economics
and Management, Changsha University of Science and Technology, Changsha 410076, China) |
| Abstract: |
| Because of the randomness of the output of distributed power supply and the load demand of end users, there exists a deviation between the actual electricity purchased by the power service provider and the electricity bidding in the wholesale market. This brings a penalty cost. Therefore, by considering the controllable load on the demand-side as a schedulable resource, this paper proposes a multi-option controllable load power adjustment compensation contract in the form of a segmented price based on the cost function of increasing/reducing load for users of a controllable load. In order to achieve a win-win situation between power service providers and controllable load users, a Stackelberg master-slave game model with both economic benefit and demand response benefit for power service providers is established. A reverse induction method based on a genetic algorithm is used to solve this problem. Finally, the changes between the operating income of power service providers and the power adjustment amount of controllable load users under the condition of a segmented compensation price and fixed compensation price are compared by numerical results. These show that the proposed segmented compensation pricing method can significantly reduce the penalty cost, effectively improve the participation of user demand response, and achieve the optimal allocation of demand response resources.
This work is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 71931003 and No. 71420107027). |
| Key words: power service providers controllable load demand response penalty costs sectional compensation electricity price a master-slave game |
