| 引用本文: | 尹纯亚,徐大成,李凤婷,等.基于主从博弈的风电场虚拟惯量辅助服务动态定价与优化分配策略[J].电力系统保护与控制,2025,53(21):121-132.[点击复制] |
| YIN Chunya,XU Dacheng,LI Fengting,et al.Dynamic pricing and optimal allocation strategy for wind farm virtual inertia auxiliary services based on leader-follower game[J].Power System Protection and Control,2025,53(21):121-132[点击复制] |
|
| 摘要: |
| “双碳”目标下新能源快速发展将带来转动惯量稀缺问题，促使风电系统提供惯量支撑愈发重要。然而，风电场通过调整其有功输出提供系统惯量支撑，降低了自身经济性。为此，提出了一种辅助服务市场下基于主从博弈的风电场虚拟惯量动态定价与优化分配方法。首先，基于风电机组的转子转速约束与功率变化约束，评估风电场惯量支撑能力。并对风电场规模进行评估，基于风电场规模设立差异化奖罚机制。其次，构建以电力市场运营商为领导者，风电场集群为跟随者的Stackelberg主从博弈模型，市场运营商对惯量动态定价以及建立奖惩机制，激励风电场集群参与系统惯量支撑。最后，基于MATLAB采用Gurobi商业求解器求解模型，并通过算例验证了所提模型与方法的可行性与有效性。 |
| 关键词: 虚拟惯量 激励机制 惯量市场 主从博弈 动态定价 惯量分配 |
| DOI：10.19783/j.cnki.pspc.241696 |
| 投稿时间：2024-12-19修订日期：2025-05-20 |
| 基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目资助(52467014)；自治区(新疆)自然科学基金-青年基金项目资助(2024D01C249) |
|
| Dynamic pricing and optimal allocation strategy for wind farm virtual inertia auxiliary services based on leader-follower game |
| YIN Chunya1,XU Dacheng1,2,LI Fengting1,LI Xiaozhu1,HAN Lu1,JIANG Jiangbo3 |
| (1. College of Electrical Engineering, Xinjiang University, Urumqi 830017, China; 2. Party School (Training Center) of
State Grid Gansu Electric Power Company, Lanzhou 730070, China; 3. State Grid Lanzhou Electric
Power Company, Lanzhou 730070, China) |
| Abstract: |
| Under the “dual-carbon” goals, the rapid development of new energy has led to a scarcity of rotational inertia, making inertia support from wind power systems increasingly important. However, providing inertia support by adjusting active power output reduces the economic efficiency of wind farms. To address this issue, a dynamic pricing and optimal allocation method for wind farm virtual inertia in the ancillary service market is proposed based on a Stackelberg game framework. First, the inertia support capability of wind farms is assessed based on rotor speed and power change constraints of wind turbines. The wind farm capacity is also evaluated, and a differentiated reward-penalty mechanism is established accordingly. Second, a Stackelberg leader-follower game model is constructed, where the power market operator acts as the leader and the wind farm cluster as followers. The market operator determines dynamic pricing and reward-penalty mechanisms to incentivize wind farms to participate in system inertia support. Finally, the proposed model and method are solved in MATLAB using the Gurobi commercial solver, and case studies verify their feasibility and effectiveness. |
| Key words: virtual inertia incentive mechanism inertia market leader-follower game dynamic pricing inertia allocation |
